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INTRODUCTION

The successorship doctrine has developed in various areas of
the law as a way to hold transferrees and successors responsible
for the liabilities and obligations of their predecessors in certain
circumstances. For example, under corporate law the successorship doctrine has been applied as an exception to the general
rule that a corporation purchasing the assets of another corporation will not be held liable for the debts and liabilities of the
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of this Article.
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predecessor.' Under the successorship doctrine, a successor corporation will be held accountable for the liabilities of the selling
corporation where: (1) there was an express or implied assump-

tion of liability; (2) the transaction constituted a consolidation
or merger; (3) the transaction was fraudulent; or (4) the successor
corporation was merely a continuation or reincarnation of the
old corporation. 2
The successorship doctrine has also been applied in the area
of labor law. With respect to the collective bargaining obligations
of predecessors, the labor law successorship doctrine has developed two basic principles. First, a labor law successor has an
obligation to bargain with the union representative of the predecessor's employees.' Second, a labor law successor generally
will not be "bound involuntarily to the substantive terms of the
4
predecessor's labor agreeement."
A number of factors are considered in determining whether
an employer will be characterized as a labor law successor. These
factors include whether "the bargaining unit remain[ed] unchanged and a majority of the employees hired by the new
employer [were] represented by a recently certified bargaining
agent .

. .

.

"I

In this regard, if a new employer's operational

structure is so different that the bargaining unit is no longer
appropriate, or if the new employer hires a workforce which
does not contain a majority of the predecessor's employees, the
new employer will not be considered a labor law successor, and
with the union representative of
will not have a duty to bargain
6
employees.
the predecessor's

1 R.J. Enstron Corp. v. Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1977);
Leannais v. Cincinnati, 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977).
2 Interceptor Corp., 555 F.2d at 281-82.
NLRB v. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
Id. These criteria are generally considered to be the prerequisites for determining
whether a new employer is a "successor." See I DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 697 (1983).
' Burns, 406 U.S. at 281.
6 Id. at 281 n.5. There is a distinction between a "successor"
employer and an
"alter ego" employer. Generally, the factors relied on by the Board to determine if an
employer is an alter ego include whether there is "substantially identical management,
business purpose, operation, equipment, customers, and supervision, as well as ownership." Danzil S. Alkire, 259 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1324 (1982), enforcement denied, 716 F.2d
1014 (4th Cir. 1983). These factors, however, are not uniformly applied or given the
same weight by all courts. See DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 195 (First Supp. 1982-84).
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SUCCESSORSHIP CLAUSE

In the coal mining industry, the labor law doctrine of successorship has been supplemented by the "successorship clause"
of Article I of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement
[hereinafter Wage Agreement or NBCWA]. The successorship
clause provides, in pertinent part:
This Agreement shall be binding upon all signatories, signatory
associations, and their successors and assigns. In consideration
of the Union's execution of this Agreement, each Employer
promises that its operations covered by this Agreement shall
not be sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred or assigned to
any successor without first securing the agreement of the successor to assume the Employer's obligations under this Agreement .7
This Article will examine recent federal court cases that have
dealt with some of the various questions arising under the Wage
Agreement's successorship clause. Specifically, the Article will
discuss federal court cases addressing the questions of who is a
successor and what is an operation within the meaning of the
successorship clause; whether the successorship clause applies to
coal lands and to leasing and contracting out; and how damages
are determined when there is a violation of the successorship
clause.
I.

WHO Is A "SUCCESSOR"?

One question raised by the "successorship clause" of Article
I of the National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement is the
definition of "successor." 8 Most cases decided to date have
assumed that a "successor" is any purchaser or transferee. For
example, in Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB, 9 the court simply assumed
that a "purchaser" was automatically a "successor" and, as

Whatever criteria are used, the effect of determining that a new employer is an "alter
ego" is to bind the new employer to the substantive terms of the labor agreement and
to impose on the new employer the same obligations to the employees as the original
employer. Id. at 194.
1 NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL WAGE AGREEMENT OF 1984, Article 1. This language
first appeared in the 1974 Wage Agreement and has been included in identical form in
all subsequent Wage Agreements with the UMWA.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text for relevant language of Article I.
614 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1980).
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such, was subject to the terms of Article 1.10 The discussion
focused on whether the successorship clause applied to coal lands
rather than on the definition of "successor."'"
Another case that assumes, without specifically deciding, that
the terms "purchaser" and "successor" are equivalent is Local
Union 7113, UMWA v. Allied Corp.'2 Although the focus of
the Allied decision was the proper measure of damages for
Allied's failure to implement the successorship clause, the court
noted that "the agreement . . . anticipated that operators might
withdraw from the coal business and, by Article I, obligated the
seller of a coal mine to require the purchaser to assume the
seller's obligations under the agreement." 3
Despite the fact that most of the cases simply assume that a
"'successor" is necessarily the same as a "purchaser," there is
at least one case, International Union, UMWA v. Eastover
Mining Co.,"4 that specifically attempts to determine who is a
"successor. " In order to understand the Eastover court's rationale for its definition of "successor," it is helpful first to look
at the background of the case.
Eastover Mining Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Duke Power Company, operated three coal mines in Kentucky
and one in Virginia. 5 In 1982, Duke Power decided to sell all
of its Eastover mines, and subsequently sold the three mines in
Kentucky without incident. 16 It was the sale of the Virginia mine,

known as the Jawbone Mine, which was operated under a con7
tract with the UMWA, that gave rise to the controversy.'

at 886. While never defining "successor," the court stated that:
the successorship clause . . . was clearly designed to assure that Amax's
own employees would retain their current contractual benefits in the event
that their place of employment is sold to a new employer. The only
obligation which the clause would place on Amax is to secure the purchaser's agreement to adopt the contract ....
Id. (emphasis added).
11Id.; see also infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
12 765 F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1985).
11Id. at 417 (emphasis added); see infra notes 120-31 and accompanying text for
10 Id.

a discussion of the damages issue.
603 F. Supp. 1038 (W.D. Va. 1985).
Id. at 1040.
16 Id.
17 Id.
Although one of the Kentucky mines was also subject to the UWMA Wage
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As the Court related the facts, Eastover negotiated with the
ANR Coal Company for sale of the Jawbone Mine."8 ANR and
its subsidiaries never had a collective bargaining relationship with
the UMWA and wanted to avoid any future involvement with
the Union. 9 To this end, ANR sought advice from a consultant
on how the Jawbone Mine could be purchased without violating
the language of Article I while still remaining free of Eastover's
obligations under the Wage Agreement. 20 ANR was subsequently
advised to require Eastover to notify the UMWA that it was
permanently shutting down the mine; to notify the employees of
the mine of that fact; and to send the employees a written notice
of termination of the Wage Agreement. 2' ANR was also advised
to allow at least one month to pass between the date Eastover
shut down the mine and the date the buy-sell agreement was
approved .

22

After a number of proposals and counterproposals for the
purchase were considered by the parties, a final purchase agreement for the Jawbone Mine was entered into between Eastover
and Virginia City Coal Company, a subsidiary of ANR that was
23
organized for the purpose of purchasing the Jawbone Mine.
The final contract for the sale of the mine contained language,
in section 1.7(a) of the purchase agreement, which provided that
the "[b]uyer reserves the right to contest the question of whether
or not it is a successor within the term of the said Wage Agreement. ' ' 24 The purchase agreement also contained a provision, in
Section 2.1(c), which stated that there was a transfer of all
"leases [and] contracts (other than the Wage Agreement). ' 25 By
this purchase agreement, Virginia City obtained the Jawbone
Mine's operations, including its leases, contracts, and equipment,
as well as assignments of Eastover's mining permits. The mine,

Agreement when that mine was sold, the provisions of Article I of the Wage Agreement
were passed on to the purchaser.
1s Id. at 1041.
19 Id.
I
21

Eastover, 603 F. Supp. at 1041.
Id.

n Id.
23

Id.

SId.
23 Id.

at 1042.
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however, was never operated during the life of the relevant 1981
Wage Agreement, 26 or thereafter, by Virginia City.
The UMWA subsequently sued Eastover, Virginia City, and
certain related companies under Section 301(a) of the Labor
Management Relations Act.2 7 The UMWA sought recission of
the sale between Eastover and Virginia City, damages against
Eastover and related defendants for breach of the 1981 Wage
Agreement, and damages against Virginia City for inducing Eastover to breach the 1981 Wage Agreement and for interfering
2
with the Union's rights thereunder. 1
The question raised in Eastover was whether Eastover
breached its obligations under Article I of the UMWA Wage
Agreement by including sections 1.7(a) and 2.1(c) in its sales
contract with Virginia City, and thereby failing to secure Virginia
City's agreement to assume Eastover's obligations as required
under the Wage Agreement. 29 Before this question could be
answered, however, the court determined that it was first necessary to formulate a definition of the term "successor." 30 In
defining the term "successor," the court noted that it "must
interpret Article I in its entirety without focusing upon a single
word. The court will consider not only the language of Article
I, but also the facts surrounding the Eastover sale and the
contract language eventually adopted between the selling defend3
ants and Virginia City." '

Eastover, 603 F. Supp. at 1042. The 1981 Wage Agreement was terminated
effective September 30, 1984, and was immediately replaced by the National Bituminous
Coal Wage Agreement of 1984 effective October 1, 1984.
27 Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)
(1982). Section 301(a) provides: "Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties." Id.
Eastover, 603 F. Supp. at 1039-40.
Id. at 1042.
30 Id.
11Id. at 1043-44; see also District 6, UMWA v. North American Coal Corp., No.
C-2-79-242, slip op. at 4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 1980). The court also considered the
bargaining history of the 1974 Wage Agreement to gain an understanding of why Article
I was first added to the 1974 Agreement. From this history, the court determined that
the UMWA bargained for the successorship clause because of its concerns over the
development of the successorship doctrine of Howard Johnson Co. v. Detroit Local
Joint Executive Board, 417 U.S. 249 (1974) and NLRB v. Burns Int'l Sec. Serv., Inc.,
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After examining the facts surrounding the sale of the Eastover mine to Virginia City, the court stated:
[e]ven if there is some question as to what the word "successor" means, there is no question what the word "assignee"
means . . . . The BCOA Agreement (Article I) applies to
assignees as well as successors. The words are interchangeable
... . Virginia City without question was an assignee; since
assignee or successor are used in the same context, Virginia
City was also a successor. 2
In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized several
factors in support of its determination that Virginia City was a
"successor." First, the court noted that the first sales contract
proposal prepared by Eastover contained a provision that unequivocally bound Virginia City to Eastover's obligation under
the Wage Agreement.33 The court saw this as Eastover's own4
recognition that Virginia City was a successor under Article 1.1
In addition, the court determined that distinctions based on the
length of time a company was shut down before a sale; on
whether the sale was for stock of the company or for assets of
the company, and on the length of time the buyer refused to
operate the mine after the purchase were "matter[s] of form
rather than substance" that were meant "to evade, rather than
enter into a meaningful contract.""
Finally, the court determined that the intent of Article I was
to avoid any post-sale litigation as to whether an entity was a
successor by requiring signatories to the Wage Agreement to
pass their obligations under the Agreement to any purchaser.36
As such, the purchaser necessarily had to be a successor in order

406 U.S. 272 (1972), which provided that passive successorship clauses were ineffectual
in binding "successors, assigns, purchasers, lessees, or transferees" and that a successor
must make an express assumption of the seller's obligations in order to be bound.
Consequently, the Eastover court determined that the purpose of Article I was to require
any seller who was signatory to the NBCWA to bind any purchaser who bought an
operation to the NBCWA. 603 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
32 Eastover, 603 F. Supp. at 1044. Compare this determination of successorship
with that of the general labor law theory, supra notes 5 and 6 and accompanying text.
3 Eastover, 603 F. Supp. at 1044.
Id.
35 Id.
16Id. at 1044.
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for Article I to have any meaning at all. 3' Accordingly, the court
found that Eastover breached its obligation under the Wage
Agreement by including in the purchase agreement the provision
allowing Virginia City to litigate its status as a "successor."'38
39
As the Eastover case and earlier cases cited herein indicate,
there is no precise definition of the term "successor" as it is
used in Article I of the Wage Agreement. These cases do reveal,
however, a trend being followed by courts that are faced with
cases involving Article I. This trend is to find, or merely assume,
that purchasers and assignees are automatically "successors"
within the meaning of Article I and therefore required to assume
the obligations of the predecessor company.

II.

WHAT Is AN "OPERATION"?

A second question raised by the successorship clause in Article I of the Wage Agreement is the definition of an "operation." As already noted, Article I prevents an employer from
selling or transferring its "operations" without first securing the
agreement of the successor to assume the seller's obligations
under the Wage Agreement. 4° Therefore, in addition to determining whether a transferee is a successor, courts must also
decide whether the employer is selling an "operation" within
the meaning of Article I.
One case that has interpreted the term "operations" is District 6, UMWA v. North American Coal Corp.,41 which involved
the sale of a coal tipple by North American to Schiappa Coal
Company and Anthony Mining Company.4 2 Prior to the sale,
North American's tipple and associated mine had been shut
4
down for at least one year due to a strike by the UMWA.

37 Id.
38 Id. at 1044-45. In further support of this conclusion, the court cited both Amax
Coal Co., 614 F.2d 872 and Allied Corp., 765 F.2d 412.
39 The types of remedies available when a company has breached the successorship
clause are discussed at infra notes 110-50 and accompanying text.
I' See supra text accompanying note 7.
" District 6, UMWA v. North American Coal Corp., No. C-2-79-242 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 21, 1980).
Q Id.
41 Id., slip op. at 2-3.
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Although North American was a signatory to the UMWA Wage
Agreement, it failed to secure an agreement from the purchasers
to assume North American's obligations under the Wage Agree44 Consequently, the UMWA sued
ment, as required by Article I.
North American for violating the provisions of Article I and
North American moved for summary judgment on the ground
45
that Article I was not applicable.
Although the parties devoted considerable time to the question of who is a successor under Article I, the court focused on
the question of whether the sale of the tipple constituted a sale
of "operations" under the Agreement. 46 The court determined
that the sale of the tipple was not a sale of operations covered
by the Agreement because all business activity and operations at
the tipple had ceased and had never been resumed.4 7 In making
this determination, the court recognized that limited recovery
activity did occur after the mine was shut down and that this
work was covered by the Wage Agreement, but stated that "it
is clear that this was merely a winding down and packing up of
the site; and in any case the transaction certainly did not involve
the sale of recovery operations." '
After holding that a sale of a structure that had been closed
for 14 months was not the sale of an "operation," the court
noted that its holding was limited to the facts of the case before
it. 49 More particularly, the court said it was not deciding a case
where the employer, in order to avoid the obligations of Article
I, shut down the mine shortly before the sale O The court further
stressed that there was no suggestion that the closing of North
American's mine and tipple was done in bad faith, since the sale
took place 14 months after mining had ceased and a year after
North American announced that it would not reopen the mine."

" Id.
41Id. at 1-2.
"1Id. at 5. The court stated that "[w]hile this question is often part of the larger,
more difficult question of successorship, in the case before the Court it is independently
determinative of the outcome."
.7 Id.

" North American, No. C-2-79-242, slip op. at 5.
19 Id. at 6.
50

Id.; see supra note 26 and accompanying text.
North American, No. C-2-79-242, slip op. at 6.
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Under these particular circumstances, the court concluded that
the sale of the tipple was "the sale of a physical asset only, and
did not constitute the sale of 'operations' as contemplated by
the Agreement.' '52
Another case that deals with the meaning of the term "operations" as used in Article I is UMWA, International Union v.
U.S. Steel Mining Company, Inc.53 Until October 13, 1982, U.S.
Steel Mining owned and operated the Geneva/Horse Canyon
Mine which was subject to the UMWA Wage Agreement.14 On
October 13, 1982, U.S. Steel Mining ceased actively mining coal
at the operation and laid off a majority of the mine's employees."

Subsequently, U.S. Steel Mining officially declared that, as
of December 31, 1983, the mine would be abandoned and indefinitely closed.5 6 The decision to close the mine was made
solely for business and economic reasons, and was not an attempt to circumvent the provisions of the Wage Agreement. 5 7 In
August 1984, the last two employees, who were retained after
the shutdown to maintain "fire watch," were laid off, and
thereafter, U.S. Steel Mining employed no bargaining unit employees at the mine.5"
After the mine was closed, U.S. Steel Mining began negotiations, in May 1984, for the sale of the mine to Kaiser Steel
Corporation.5 9 The sale of the mine was completed in December
1984, with no provision for Kaiser to assume U.S. Steel Mining's
obligations under the Wage Agreement. 60 The UMWA subse-

52 Id.
11 636 F. Supp. 151 (C.D. Utah 1986), appeal docketed, No. 85-1795 (10th Cir.
May 29, 1986).
I' U.S. Steel Mining, 636 F. Supp. at 153.
51 Id. After the mine was closed, a few employees were recalled in late 1983 to
prepare the mine for eventual shutdown.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
19 These negotiations began "about 19 months after active mining operations . . .
had ceased and about four months after the mine [was] officially closed and formally
abandoned." Id.
I U.S. Steel Mining, 636 F. Supp. at 153. After the sale was completed, Kaiser
at no time reopened the mine or hired employees to produce coal, although it did engage
in a limited amount of maintenance and security work.
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quently sued U.S. Steel Mining for breach of its 6obligations
under Article I and Kaiser for inducing that breach. 1
In deciding whether U.S. Steel Mining had an obligation to
secure such an agreement from Kaiser under Article I, the court
stated it was "convinced that, as a matter of law, a mining
'operation,' for purposes of Article I of the 1984 NBCWA,
refers to a mine site or facility where active coal mining operations are being conducted . . . assuming the mine was closed in
good faith." ' 62 The court stressed that it was necessary to "carefully scrutinize" the closure and sale of the mine to determine
if the actions were taken in good faith or whether they were an
attempt to evade the Wage Agreement. 63 The scrutiny was necessary to "prevent employers 'from engaging in "paper tricks"
insidiously devised to unjustly deprive [employees] of contractual
' ' 64
rights they have earned through years of toil in the mines.
Finding that the sale between U.S. Steel Mining and Kaiser was
accomplished in good faith, the court relied on the timing of
and the reasons for the shutdown. 6 The court further stated
that the limited recovery and maintenance work that occurred
after the mine was closed was not sufficient to establish that a
mining "operation" had been transferred to Kaiser.66
As the foregoing discussion reveals, the courts which have
focused on the definition of "operations" under Article I are
unwilling to extend the term to the sale of a mine that had, in
good faith, been shut down for legitimate economic and business

61 Id. at 152.
62 Id. at 153-54. In making this determination, the court rejected the UMWA's

argument that "an 'operation' is transferred when the capacity to mine coal is transferred." The court stated that "the facts that Kaiser has the legal right to operate a
mine that has been closed and abandoned in good faith and that the mine has recoverable
reserves and is capable of producing coal do not mean that Kaiser purchased a mining
'operation."' Id. at 154 n.3.
63 Id.

" Id. at 154 (citing Local Union 2935, UMWA and Nephi Coal Properties, Inc.,
Arb. Rev. Bd. 78-17, at 17-18 (Oct. 10, 1979)).
65 U.S. Steel Mining, 636 F. Supp. at 154; see also supra text accompanying notes
34-35. The court distinguishes the Eastover case, supra notes 15-16 and accompanying
text, relied on by the UMWA, by stating that the actions taken by Eastover "were an

obvious and admitted attempt to circumvent and evade the collective bargaining agreement." U.S. Steel Mining, 636 F. Supp. at 155.
"

Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 33.
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reasons. Those courts have, therefore, held that the successorship
clause imposes a duty on the selling corporation to secure an

agreement from the purchasing company only when there has
been a sale or transfer of a facility where active mining operations are being conducted.

III.

DOES THE SUCCESSORSHIP CLAUSE APPLY TO COAL LANDS?

In addition to the questions of who is a successor and what
is an operation under Article I of the Wage Agreement, there is
the question of whether the successorship clause applies to a
signatory company's coal lands. This issue was addressed in

67
Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB.

The controversy in Amax arose out of an impasse in collective bargaining between Amax and the UMWA. 68 Among other
claims, 69 the UMWA proposed that a "successorship clause"
materially identical to the Article I successorship clause be included in any agreement reached by the parties. 70 Claiming the
Union's proposed successorship clause violated section 8(e) of
the National Labor Relations Act, 71 Amax charged the UMWA
with an unfair labor practice under section 8(b)(4)(A) of the
Act.

72

Faced with the question of whether the successorship clause
violated section 8(e), the National Labor Relations Board decided that the clause was lawful because a "transfer of a portion
of Amax mining operations to a successor [did] not constitute

67

614 F.2d 872 (3d Cir. 1980).

" Id. at 877.
69 The Amax

case dealt with a number of other labor law issues which are not
relevant to the discussion presented in this article.
7oAmax, 614 F.2d at 885; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
7.29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982). Section 8(e) provides in relevant part: "It shall be
an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter any
contract or agreement, . . . whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees . . .to
cease doing business with any other person .....
" Id.
71See Amax, 614 F.2d at 885. Section 8(b)(4)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice
for a labor organization "to engage in, or to induce or encourage . . . a strike or a
refusal . . . to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on
any goods, articles, materials . . . where . . .an object thereof is . . . to enter into
any agreement which is prohibited by [section 8(e)]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1982).
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'doing business' within the meaning of' ' Section 8(e), and because
the effect of the clause was primary. 7
The Third Circuit in turn agreed with this decision.74 The
court stated that the purpose of section 8(e) was to protect
neutral employers and their employees from being pressured into
assisting a union in its dispute with another employer.7 5 Since a
sale by Amax of all or part of its business operations would not
involve a continuing relationship with the purchaser, there was
in a labor dispute between the
no possibility of involving Amax
7 6
purchaser and its employees.

Nevertheless, Amax continued to argue that the successorship
clause was a violation of section 8(e) because it would inhibit
Amax's freedom to trade its dormant coal lands, which Amax
alleged was a common and necessary practice in the coal industry. 77 In response to this argument, the NLRB found that Amax

continually purchased and traded its properties for coal lands
owned or leased by other coal producers in order to put together
a contiguous block of land large enough to support a viable
mining plan. 78 The NLRB further found that Amax did not use
its coal lands to produce or process coal unless there was an
area large enough to support 15 to 20 years of mining operations. 79 Also, Amax only traded parcels of land that were not
being used to produce or process coal, and Amax seldom, if
ever, traded coal lands that constituted a viable mining plan.80
Given these findings, the Third Circuit stated that the proposed successorship clause did not apply to Amax's dormant
coal lands. 8 The court's rationale was that under the enabling
clause and coal lands clause of the collective bargaining agreement,8

2

71

Amax, 614 F.2d at 885.
Id. at 886.

75

Id.

76

Id.

11

77 Id.
78

Id.

71 Amax, 614
'o

F.2d at 886.

Id.

Id. at 886 n.12.
The enabling clause would require Amax, during the life of the contract, to
agree to the same contract terms for any of its other sub-bituminous mines whose
employees selected the UMWA as their bargaining representative. Id. at 883; see infra
note 96 for relevant language of the coal lands clause.
82
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the contract only became effective with respect to those coal
lands which Amax put 'into production' during the term of
the contract, and then only after the UMWA became the
recognized bargaining representative at the new facility, a development which obviously cannot occur until Amax has employees working there.83

Moreover, according to the court, since Amax did not engage
in mining operations until the trading of its coal lands resulted

in a viable mining plan, there was no reason for Amax to hire
employees to mine coal on its dormant lands.14 Consequently,

Amax's trading of dormant coal lands to a successor did not
constitute "doing business" within the meaning of section 8(e). 5
As the Amax case reveals, the obligations under the successorship clause of Article I may not legally be applied to the

transfer of a coal company's coal lands on which no active
mining operations are being conducted

IV.

.16

DOES THE SUCCESSORSiHP CLAUSE APPLY TO LEASES,
LICENSING AND CONTRACTING OUT?

Another question raised by a discussion of Article I is to
which types of transactions the successorship clause applies. For
example, does the successorship clause apply only to transactions
where the owner transfers its entire interest in the operation, or
does it also apply to transactions in which the owner retains
some type of interest in the operation? As noted previously,
Article I of the Wage Agreement provides that an Employer's

Amax, 614 F.2d at 886 n.12.
Id.
85 See id. The court also found that, "even if the conveyance of a portion of
Amax's coal mining operations . . . constituted 'doing business' within the meaning of
Section 8(e), the successorship clause is nonetheless lawful because its effect is primary."
Id. at 886.
" The conclusion in Amax is consistent with the definition of the term "operations" advanced in U.S. Steel Mining, 636 F. Supp. 151. But see Beth Energy Corp. and
UMWA, District 30 and Local 5741, No. 84-30-86-229, slip op. at 15 (Nov. 24, 1986),
where Arbitrator Edwin R. Render extended the term "operations" to include coal
lands. This award is currently the subject of litigation in Beth Energy Mines, Inc. v.
District 30 and Local 5741, UMWA, No. 87-38 Civ. (E.D. Ky. Feb. 19, 1987), and is
also the subject of unfair labor practice proceedings before the NLRB in UMWA
District 30 and Local 5741, No. 9-CE-49-1, slip op. at -2 (Dec. 30, 1986).
83
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operations will not be "sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred
or assigned" to a successor without securing the agreement of
the successor to assume the Employer's obligations under the
Agreement ."
This language was interpreted by the Tenth Circuit in Lone
Star Steel Co. v. NLRB. 8a The cause of action in Lone Star,
like that in Amax Coal Co. v. NLRB,8 9 arose out of collective
bargaining negotiations.90 Lone Star, a manufacturer of steel
products, owned and operated a coal mine in order to assure
that it would have a continuing supply of bituminous coal. 91
Although Lone Star was not a member of the Bituminous Coal
Operators' Association [hereinafter BCOA] when it began operating the mine in 1973, it agreed with the UMWA to abide by
the terms of the 1971 National Bituminous Wage Agreement. 92
In September of 1974, in anticipation of the expiration of
the 1971 Wage Agreement, Lone Star notified the UMWA that
it would not be bound by the new national agreement negotiated
by the BCOA, but would negotiate separately with the Union
for a new contract. 93 Because an agreement was not reached
upon the expiration of the 1971 Wage Agreement, the Lone Star
employees joined a nationwide economic strike. 94 Although Lone
Star and the UMWA continued to negotiate, they failed to reach
disagreement over the Union's proposed
an agreement because of
"successorship" clause95 and "application of contract" clause. 96
The employees, therefore, continued to strike. In March 1975,
Lone Star filed unfair labor practice charges against the UMWA,
11NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL WAGE
88 639 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1980).

AGREEMENT OF

1984, Article I.

19 614 F.2d 872 (3rd Cir. 1980).

90Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 547-48.
91Id. at 547.
92 Id. at 547 n.1.
91Id. at 547-48.
9 Id. at 548.
91 See supra note 7 and accompanying text for the language of this clause.
The application of the contract clause, which is also known as the coal lands
clause, was carried over from the 1971 Agreement and provided: "the Employers agree
that this Agreement covers the operation of all the coal lands, coal producing and coal
preparation facilities owned or held under lease by them . . . or acquired during its
term which may hereafter (during the term of this Agreement) be put into production
or use." Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 548.
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alleging that the successorship clause violated section 8(e) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 97 and that the Union violated
section 8(b)(4)(A) of the Act98 by striking to compel acceptance
of that clause. 99
In support of its unfair labor practice charges, Lone Star
argued that the language of the successorship clause applied not
only to asset sales, but also to "leasing, subcontracting and
other forms of 'doing business' within the meaning of section
8(e)."100 The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Lone Star's interpretation of the successorship clause, stating that "[tihe language
[of the clause] refers to selling, conveying, or otherwise transferring or assigning; leasing and subcontracting are nowhere
mentioned." 0'
Interpreting this language, the court noted that under the
rule of ejusdem generis,10 2 the general words "otherwise transferring or assigning" refer to transactions of the same nature or
character as transactions involving "selling and conveying."' 13
The court found that the terms "selling and conveying" referred
to those transactions that are permanent in nature. 1° According
to the court, therefore, the terms "otherwise transferring or
assigning" should also be viewed as referring to means of permanently transferring property, rather than to leasing or subcontracting, which are temporary in character.' 5
In making this determination, the court read the successorship clause in light of other contract provisions that impose
specific restrictions on leasing, subleasing and licensing out of
coal lands and coal mining operations, as well as restrictions on
subcontracting of unit work. 1° The court stated that these spe-

29 U.S.C. § 158(e); see supra note 71 for relevant language of § 8(e).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A); see supra note 72 for language of § 8(b)(4)(A).
" Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 548-49.
110Id. at 551.
"I Id. at 553.
102 Under the ejusdem generis canon of statutory construction, general words which
follow an enumeration of particular classes of things will be construed as applying only
to things of the same general class as those specifically enumerated. See Butler County
Memorial Hospital v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 352, 356 (3d Cir. 1985).
103
Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 553.
IO Id.

105
Id.
,"*Id.

THE SUCCEssoRSHIP CLAUSE

1987]

cific restrictions, because they do not require a lessee or subcontractor to assume the entire contract, "would be mere surplusage
if the successorship clause applied to a lessee or subcontractor.''107 Consequently, the court determined that the successorship clause applied only to those kinds of permanent dispositions
of assets that fall outside the scope of section 8(e),10 and not to
transactions of a less permanent nature, such as leasing or subcontracting. lO9
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, at least one court
has determined that the successorship clause does not apply to
temporary transactions such as leasing or subcontracting. Rather,
the clause applies to those transactions in which the operator
permanently disposes of its entire interest in the operation.
V.

How

ARE DAMAGES MEASURED FOR BREACH OF THE
SUCCESSORSHIP CLAUSE

The final issue to be addressed in this discussion of the
successorship clause of the NBCWA involves the type of damages that may be recovered as a result of a breach of the
obligations under the clause. This includes damages that may be
awarded against both the selling employer and the purchasing
entity.

101
Id. But see Local Union 2935, UMWA and Nephi Coal Properties, Inc., Arb.
Rev. Bd. 78-17, slip op. at 24 (1979). There the Arbitration Review Board determined
that the successorship clause,
together with the agreed regulations ...
intended that when an Employer,
bound by the Agreement, operating a mine site or facility, leases, subleases,
assigns, licenses, or otherwise transfers that operation to another operation
. . .the Employer is bound to contract that the subsequent operator taking
from him will assume and carry out those obligations.
Id. Although this Article does not address the myriad arbitration decisions rendered
under and interpreting the Article I successorship clause, this particular decision is noted
because Article XXIII(k) of the 1984 Wage Agreement provides that "decisions of the
Arbitration Review Board rendered prior to the expiration of the [1978 Wage Agreement]
shall continue to have precedential effect under this Agreement to the extent that the
basis for such decisions have not been modified by subsequent changes in this Agreement." NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL WAGE AGREEMENT OF 1984, ARTICLE XXIII(k). As
noted, supra note 7, the current successorship clause is identical to that contained in all
Wage Agreements since 1974.
11 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982).
,09
Lone Star, 639 F.2d at 553.
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One case dealing with the question of damages in a successorship context is Local Union 7113, UMWA v. Allied Corp."0
Allied Corporation owned and operated two coal mines in West
Virginia, and was a signatory to the 1978 Wage Agreement.' 1'
In 1980, Allied sold these mines to companies who were also
signatories to the 1978 Wage Agreement and who later became
signatories to the 1981 Wage Agreement. Allied, however, was
not a party to either the 1981 or the 1984 Wage Agreements
since, as of the date of the sale of its mines, it was no longer
in the coal business. 112
When the companies entered into the sales agreements for
Allied's mines, they included a provision that provided that the
purchasing companies would not assume any of Allied's obligations under the 1978 Wage Agreement, except those specifically referenced." 3 In other words, Allied failed to secure an
agreement from the purchasers to assume Allied's obligations as
required by the successorship clause of Article I. More particularly, Allied failed to require the purchasing companies to provide benefits to Allied's retired miners and instead continued to
provide those benefits itself for the remaining term of the 1978
Agreement and for part of the 1981 Agreement." 14 Upon Allied's
refusal to continue to pay the retirement benefits, the Union and
the retirees initiated an action against Allied and the purchasing
companies, and in the alternative against the UMWA 1974 Benefit Plan and Trust."

5

After determining that the Trustees denial of benefits was
not arbitrary or capricious, the court then turned to the question
of whether Allied and the purchasing companies were responsible

765 F.2d 412 (4th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 415.
112 Id.
.3 Id.
"
Id.
M See Allied, 765 F.2d at 415. Before bringing suit, the retirees requested a
determination from the Trustees of the 1974 Benefit Trust as to whether they were
eligible to receive benefits from the Trust. The Trustees determined that Article XX of
the Wage Agreement defined beneficiaries of the 1974 Benefit Trust "as only those
retirees whose last employer and its successor, if any, were no longer in business." The
Trustees further found that, even though Allied was no longer in the coal business, the
purchasing companies were successors still in business and therefore the 1974 Benefit
Trust could not pay benefits to the retired miners. Id.
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for providing the benefits." '6 The court first noted that because
the obligation to provide retirement benefits under the 1978
Wage Agreement ceased upon expiration of that Agreement," 7
it might appear that Allied had no duty to continue paying
retirement benefits because it was not a signatory to the 1981
Wage Agreement. The court further observed that since the
purchasing companies specifically stated they would not assume
Allied's obligations, it appeared that they also were not responsible for the retirees' benefits." 8
Theorizing about what might happen if Article XX was the
only provision to be considered, the court stated:
If that were the complete picture, the answer to this dispute
simply would be that after expiration of the 1978 agreement
• . . no one had a duty to provide the retired miners with the
disputed benefits. The agreement, however, also anticipated
that operators might withdraw from the coal business and, by
Article I, obligated the seller of a coal mine to require the
purchaser to assume the seller's obligations under the agreement. 119

The court next recognized that, because Allied clearly breached
Article I when it agreed that purchasing companies would not
assume Allied's obligations under the Wage Agreement, the
questions became the amount of damages suffered by the retirees
and the appropriate remedy in light of the provisions of Article
I. 120

The court rejected Allied's argument that it was obligated to
pay the retirement benefits only until the expiration of the 1978
Wage Agreement.' 2' The court also rejected the claim that the
purchasing companies were not required to pay the benefits

116

Id. at 417.

,, See id. Article XX of the 1978 Wage Agreement, which was the provision that
established Allied's duty to provide retirement benefits, provided in relevant part that
the "benefits provided pursuant to such plans shall be guaranteed during the term of
this Agreement .
NATIONAL BITUMINOUS COAL WAGE AGREEMENT OF 1978, ARTICLE
XX, at 94.
"I Allied, 765 F.2d at 417.

19 Id.; see supra note 7 and accompanying text for language of Article I.
'2
Allied, 765 F.2d at 417-18.
121

Id.

at 418.
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because, even if they had agreed to assume Allied's obligations,
the renegotiation of these benefits in the 1981 Agreement was
speculative at best. 12 2 The court rejected these arguments for the
reason that they failed to consider "both the nature of the
underlying principles of law and the nature of Allied's obligations under the 1978 contract. "1

23

In making its determination, the court first noted that labor
agreements were not to be interpreted under ordinary contract
principles, thereby rejecting the company's argument that the
case turned on the date when Allied's obligations under the 1978
Wage Agreement expired. 124 Examining the bargaining history in
the coal industry, the court found that, prior to the 1978 Wage
Agreement, coal operators for many years had paid retirement
benefits. 12 Virtually the same language as was contained in the
1978 Wage Agreement was subsequently included in the 1981
and 1984 Agreements. 126 Under these circumstances, the court
found that if Allied had not breached its duty under Article I
and had required the purchasing companies to assume Allied's
obligations, the UMWA would have certainly insisted that the
purchasing companies bargain over the continuation of these
benefits in subsequent negotiations. 127 According to the court,
therefore,
if Allied had not breached the 1978 contract, the complaining
retirees very probably would have been covered by [the purl= Id.
23

Id.

See id. (The court cited Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
456-57 (1957), where the Supreme Court stated that "the substantive law to apply in
suits under § 301(a) is federal law which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws . . . . The range of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the
nature of the problem."). The court in Allied also cited Richardson v. Communications
Workers of America, 443 F.2d 974, 978-79 (8th Cir. 1971) for the proposition that:
The expiration date of a bargaining contract does not place the employee
in jeopardy of losing his job at the termination of the agreement. ...
The employee, the union which represents him, the company which employs
him, each contemplate a "subsisting" contractual relationship for an indefinite period of time. This is particularly true in established industries
where continual dealings with a recognized union foster renewals and
renegotiations.
765 F.2d at 419.
"I Allied, 765 F.2d at 420.
4

Im Id.
127

Id.
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chasing companies] until the expiration of the 1984 contract
and thereafter as long as those corporations or their successors
were in the business of mining coal and employing union coal
miners. 128
Moreover, the court determined that the consequences of
Allied's breach were easily foreseeable; the failure to secure an
agreement from the successor companies would leave the retired
miners without coverage and with no responsible employer against
whom the Union could make contract demands.' 29 As a result
of these circumstances, the court found that the appropriate
remedy would be to require Allied to continue to provide retirement benefits until it obtained agreements from the purchasing
companies to assume this obligation. 30 Finally, the court noted
that the damages caused by Allied's breach of Article I could
only flow as long as there was a successor coal mine employer
in its chain of transfer who would agree to continue the coverage. 13'
The issue of which types of damages may be considered in
a successorship case is also addressed in International Union,
UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co. [hereinafter Eastover III].
After determining that Eastover breached its duties under Article
I of the Wage Agreement,'
and that the purchasing company
tortiously interfered with the contractual relations between Eastover and the UMWA, l 3 the district court faced the question of
the remedies to which the Union was entitled. 3 5

'2 Id.
129Id. at 420-21.
110 See id. at 421.

Allied, 765 F.2d at 421.
International Union, UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co., No. 83-0209-B (W.D.
Va. Aug. 21, 1986) [hereinafter EastoverIII] (a supplemental memorandum opinion and
order was issued on Nov. 17, 1986 [hereinafter Eastover IV] and a further order was
issued on January 14, 1987 [hereinafter Eastover ]); see supra notes 14-21 and accompanying text for relevant facts in the Eastover case.
"I' International Union, UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co., 603 F. Supp. 1038, 104142 (W.D. Va. 1985) [hereinafter Eastover 1] (The parties included a successorship
provision in the sales agreement which the court subsequently found insufficient because
it gave the purchaser the right to litigate with the Union over whether it was a "successor" within the meaning of Article I.); see supra notes 30-38 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the court's reasoning in Eastover L
1 International Union, UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co., 623 F. Supp. 1141 (W.D.
3
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In Eastover III, the UMWA sought a number of remedies
from both the selling and the purchasing companies. The remedies requested against Eastover, the selling company, included:
1) rescission of the purchase agreement between Eastover and
the purchasing company; 2) damages in the form of wages lost
by employees at the purchased mine and dues and royalties lost
because the sale of the mine resulted in the mine being closed
sooner than it otherwise would have been; 3 6 and 3) attorney
fees. As to the purchasing company, the UMWA requested 1)
damages in the form of lost wages; 2) punitive damages; and 3)
37
attorney fees. 1
Faced with these requests, the court first determined that the
Union was not entitled to the equitable remedy of rescission of
the purchase agreement. 3 8 The court reasoned that because it
had already determined that the purchasing company was a
successor under Article I, the purchasing company would be
required to assume Eastover's obligations under the Agreement. 13 9 This assumption would ensure that the employees' in4
terests at the purchased mine would be adequately protected.' 0
In addressing the damages claims, the court, after considering additional memoranda submitted by the parties, made conclusions of law with respect to some items, and scheduled a trial
on other items.' 14 While the court stated that the International
Union did have authority to bring suit on behalf of individual
members for lost wages, the evidence revealed that regardless of

Va. 1985) [hereinafter Eastover 11] (The court determined that the purchasing company
tortiously interfered with Eastover's contractual relations by pursuading Eastover to
include the insufficient successorship provision in their sales agreement.).
"I Eastover II, No. 83-0209-B, slip op. at 2 (The question of the proper remedies
arose as a result of motions by the parties to compel discovery. Because the case arose
out of the parties' motions to compel discovery, the court concluded that it must first
make a determination about the kinds of relief to which the Union was potentially
entitled. The court, therefore, granted the parties an opportunity to brief the court on
their positions regarding the types of relief requested.).
116 Id. at 2-3; see supra note 22 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
premature closing of the Eastover mine.
"I Eastover III, No. 83-0209-B, slip op. at 3.
138Id. at 4.
139 Id.
slip op. at 1 (Memorandum Opinion
140 Id.; see also Eastover IV, No. 83-0209-B,
and Order, Nov. 17, 1986).
14 Eastover IV, No. 83-0209-B,
slip op. at 1-2.
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any breach of the contract by Eastover, the company would
142
have nevertheless shut down operations for economic reasons.
The court concluded, therefore, that no wages had been lost as
a result of the breach. 143 As to the purchasing company's liability
for lost wages, the court felt that since the purchaser had not
operated the mine, no wages had been lost because of the
transaction. The court refused to grant summary judgment, however, and instead scheduled a trial on this issue.'"
Considering the claim for royalties based on production, the
court found that the union was not the proper plaintiff to sue
145
for these payments under Article XX of the Wage Agreement.
In addition, the court stated that since Eastover "planned to
cease mining regardless of any sale to [the purchasing company]
. . . [and] that such damages are too speculative; the court
holds that none of the defendants are liable for royalty [sic] due
to UMWA.'" 146 Because "Eastover would have ceased mining
regardless of any breach of contract with UMWA, and thus had
no employees," the court also found that Eastover could not be
147
held liable for union dues.

Finally, in Eastover III the court stated that the Union was
potentially entitled to punitive damages against the purchasing
148
company, but not against Eastover as the selling company.
This opinion was based on the court's belief that, although
punitive damages are not awarded for breach of contract, they
are allowed in tort actions. 49 Therefore, since the purchasing
company's liability was based on tortious interference with contractual relations between Eastover and the UMWA, the pur-

l42
Id. at 2.
143

Id.

" Id.
''

Id.

at 1.

Id. In a supplemental order entered after a motion for clarification of the court's
memorandum opinion and order of November 17, the court determined that as to the
purchasing company, the claims for union dues, royalties and back wages remained.
With regard to the question of attorney's fees against the selling defendants, the court
stated that it was a question that could be properly "addressed at the end of this case
upon petition by the plaintiff." International Union, UMWA v. Eastover Mining Co.,
No. 83-0209-B, slip op. at 1 (Order, Jan. 14, 1987) (Eastover V).
141Eastover IV, No. 83-0209-B, slip op. at 1-2.
"I Eastover III, No. 83-0209-B, slip op. at 5 n.4.
149

Id.
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1 After further
chaser was potentially liable for punitive damages. 50
briefing by the parties, the court concluded that since no punitive
damages had been alleged in the complaint, that issue was not
properly before the court. 5 The court then granted leave for
the union to amend its complaint to allege a claim for punitive
damages against the purchaser. 5 2
These cases demonstrate that, while there are no precise rules
that must be followed in fashioning a remedy for a breach of
Article I of the Wage Agreement, there are some guidelines that
should be considered. First, courts are willing to extend the
measure of damages past the expiration of the contract and to
hold a selling company liable for benefits not being provided
for by the purchasing company as a result of the breach. Second,
companies may be liable for damages such as dues and royalties
that are caused by a breach of Article I as long as these damages
are not too speculative.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion has focused on issues that have
been presented in federal court cases involving the Article I
"successorship clause" of the National Bituminous Coal Wage
Agreement (or materially identical clauses). While exhaustive of
federal court cases to date, the discussion does not address the
many other issues that may yet arise under the successorship
clause, or survey other forums (such as arbitration) where such
issues may be addressed. Nevertheless, the discussion serves as
a starting point in identifying issues arising under the successorship clause, and in evaluating how such issues might be disposed
of in both federal court and other tribunals.

I"0See id. This opinion is consistent with decisions in other cases dealing with
punative damages in actions under the Labor Management Relations Act.
Printing Pressmen v. Canton Repository, 577 F. Supp. 455, 459 (N.D.
(punative damages disfavored in § 301 actions); Dian v. United Steelworkers
486 F. Supp. 700, 706 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (courts consistently reject awards
damages in area of the LMRA).
" Eastover IV, No. 83-0209-B, slip op. at 2.
152 Eastover V, No. 83-0209-B, slip op. at 1.
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